In IEEE 802.11 based wireless networks adding more access points does not always guarantee an increase of network capacity. In some cases, additional access points may contribute to degrade the aggregated network throughput as more interference is introduced. This paper characterizes the power interference in CSMA/CA based networks consisting of nodes using directional antenna. The severity of the interference is quantized via an improved form of the Attacking Case metric as the original form of this metric was developed for nodes using omnidirectional antenna.
Introduction
IEEE 802.11 based wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies had a tremendous growth in recent years. Cheap and widely available equipments that can be deployed without a license are some of the factors contributing for the technology to gain popularity. A substantial number of access points (APs) are needed to provide coverage for areas such as a university or a city centre. Further, different entities may setup WLANs in the same geographical area uncoordinated. As a consequence, overlapping WLANs emerge. Lack of planning causes the network to saturate due to interference, and reach its capacity faster. Installing additional APs does not increase the capacity of network beyond a certain limit; moreover, if not done carefully the performance of the network could degrade further due to hidden and exposed nodes.
In wireless networks interference is a fundamental issue. Interference is the disturbance caused by a node's RF transmission into neighboring node(s). High transmission powers increase the number of nodes being interfered. The severity of interference can be quantized using the performance metric Attacking Case [1] . This metric uses information such as nodes position, transmission power, signal to interference ratio and radio propagation model to characterize the instances where simultaneous transmissions are not allowed and, if allowed, the transmission would not be successful. A high Attacking Case value indicates a severe interference in the network. Therefore this metric is useful to understand and to optimize the performance of a wireless network.
The IEEE 802.11 standard caters for omnidirectional antenna (OA) [2] but there are many IEEE 802.11 based network deployed using directional antenna (DA) [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . The well known motivations for using DA [8, 9] include: 1) a node is able to selectively send signals to desired directions. This allows the receiver node to avoid interference that comes from unwanted directions, thereby increasing the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR); 2) more users could utilize a network simultaneously due to the spatial reuse factor which is higher than OA; 3) in a multihop network, a source is able to reach its destination node in a lesser number of hops due to the increase of transmission range because of the higher antenna gain. For these reasons, DA may be preferred to OA in some wireless network scenarios. This paper aims to characterize the power interference for IEEE 802.11 based networks consisting of nodes using DA. To quantize the severity of interference in a wireless network, the Attacking Case metric defined in [1] is adopted as ref- We have considered the wireless video surveillance network shown in Fig. 1 as the basic scenario for our study. A video surveillance camera is attached to an IEEE 802.11 based station (STA) which is randomly placed in a network.
The STA will connect to its closest AP placed at a fixed location and send its video traffic towards the AP. In our scenario the APs have access to the Internet via a wired connection. The network operates using the Basic Access Scheme When a node (STA or AP) transmits, all other nodes within its power interference range are prohibited from transmitting in the same channel until the end of its current transmission. Individual DATA frames are acknowledged by an ACK frame and retransmission is scheduled by the sender if no ACK is received. Only when the medium is free the other nodes are allowed to transmit after waiting for a random time interval. As each STA is fitted with a video surveillance camera, it always has traffic to send and aggressively competes for accessing the medium. This paper provides one major contribution -an improved Attacking Case metric that quantizes the severity of interference in IEEE 802.11 based networks consisting of nodes using DA. Our current metric differs from Liew's Attacking Case metric [1] on the following aspects: a) the consideration of direction of transmission θ when the power constraints are built; b) the adoption of Protocol Collision Prevention Constraints using carrier sensing range and transmission range; c) association of a weight w to the edge of the LinkInterference Graph, Transmitter-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph, and Receiver-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph. The improved Attacking Case is backward compatible with the former definition and can also be used in networks using OA. Our contribution can be particularly useful for network planners to understand the severity of interference in their network and make remedial actions to reduce it; an interference reduction effort is successful if Attacking Case af ter < Attacking Case bef ore .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the related works and show the research space our work fills. In Section 3 we introduce the power constraints in IEEE 802.11 networks. In Section 4 we present the graph model used to obtain the improved Attacking Case metric.
The power constraints are utilized to characterize the graph model. In Section 5 we describe the simulation carried out and the performance results obtained.
Finally, in Section 6 we draw the conclusions and indicate topics for future work. 
Related Work
In this section we present relevant related works and review the literature from the perspective of interference modeling. Fig. 2 illustrates a possible taxonomy for interference models where the related works are categorized by antenna type, usage of protocol model, and proposal of a Metric To Quantize Interference (MTQI). This taxonomy will also be used to describe the research space our work fits in.
The type of antenna a node uses influences the severity of interference in a wireless network. Renato and Fagner [10] modeled interference for wireless ad hoc network; they found signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) approaches a constant value when the number of nodes increases around a receiving node if the path loss parameter is greater than two. Hence, communication is feasible for near neighbors though the number of interferers scales. Liu et al. [11] demonstrated the reduction of interference by tuning the carrier sense threshold; they concluded that the optimum carrier sensing range should be balanced with the spatial reuse and the impact of interference in order to optimize the aggregate throughput of nodes. The works by Renato and Fagner, and Liu et al. including several other recent works in [12, 13, 14, 15] have modeled interference for nodes using OA and may not be suitable for nodes using DA.
We modeled interference for nodes using DA and our proposed model does also address nodes using OA.
Gupta and Kumar proposed the Protocol Model [16] . Suppose X i refers to the physical position of node i. When node i transmits to node j using a specific channel, this transmission would be successfully received by node j, if
for every node k simultaneously transmitting over the same channel. ∆ is related to power margin required to ensure the successful reception at node j even though node k transmits at the same time. The Gupta and Kumar's Protocol Model is said to consider only the DATA to DATA collision constraints between two simultaneous transmitting links. Liew [17] pointed though Gupta and Kumar's proposed model is named as a Protocol Model it does not fully characterize the medium access protocol being used. Hence, Liew proposed another model [1] where Physical Collision Constraints and Protocol Collision Prevention Constraints among the DATA and protocol specific control packets were considered. Basel et al. [18] have also proposed a model considering the protocol components of a transmission. They studied the relationship between tuning carrier sensing threshold and transmission power control for Basic Access Scheme and RTS/CTS Access Scheme. Although the control packets may slightly reduce the collision among contending hosts, their impact on the spatial reuse and the added overhead outweigh their benefits specifically when used at high rates. This comparative study has showed that the Basic Access Scheme always outperforms the RTS/CTS Access Scheme. Although Liew's and Basel's proposals including the recent works in [19, 20] reflect a more accurate model as they have considered a protocol model, they are only suitable for network using OA. We model interference using protocol model for network using DA.
Li et al. [21] have investigated the capacity of wireless networks using DAs.
They proposed that the number of beams of DAs need to increase as the num-ber of nodes increases in order for both random and arbitrary networks to scale.
Although Li's proposal including the recent works in [22, 23, 24] have modeled interference for network using DA they have not proposed a metric to measure the severity of interference. In fact, there are not many works done to quantize the severity of interference in an aggregated form for a wireless network. Parameters such as throughput and packet error ratio do not directly explain the interference in a wireless network. SINR is perhaps the closest way to quantize interference, but it is not a global metric. Liew [1] proposed the Attacking Case, a metric that considers the interference caused by protocol dependent and protocol independent constraints which are captured in graphs. Although very good, the approach was developed for nodes using omnidirectional antenna. We extend the Attacking Case metric to cater for nodes using DA.
Power Constraints in IEEE 802.11 Network
A node using DA is able to transmit at one specific angular direction at a time slot and later change direction to transmit at a different angle at another time slot. In this section we extend the Physical Collision Constraints and Protocol
Collision Prevention Constraints proposed in [1] to accommodate DA. At the end of the section we discuss the differences between our proposed extensions and Liew's models.
Physical Collision Constraints
The Physical Collision Constraints can be modeled using the pair-wise interference model. For a link under the pair-wise interference model, the interferences from the other links are considered one by one. In particular, the pair-wise interference model does not take into account the cumulative effects of the interferences from the other links [20] .
where P (a, θ b , b) is the power received by node b from the direction θ b of node a and P θ b a is the power transmitted by node a in the direction of node b as shown 
where G 
where K is the Signal to Interference Ratio (SIR) requirement for a packet to be successfully decoded by the IEEE 802.11 protocol (e.g 10 dB). Independently of T i transmitting first or T j transmitting first, as long as the two transmissions overlap in time, T j 's DATA transmission will be interfered at R j if the constraint in Eq. 4 is satisfied. Similar relationships can be established for the other 3
constraints. The transmission of Link i will interfere with the transmission of Link j if,
Protocol Collision Prevention Constraints
The Protocol Collision Prevention Constraints of IEEE 802.11 consider the effect of carrier sensing. The goal of carrier sensing is to prevent simultaneous transmissions. The prevention of a transmission can be induced at the transmitter's side, at the receiver's side or at both sides. There are two types of carrier sensing that would prevent a transmission:
Physical Carrier Sensing (PCS) -The PCS defined by IEEE is the Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) mechanism [2] . When a carrier is sensed by the radio interface, the CCA mechanism indicates a busy medium and prevents the radio interface from initiating its own transmission. If a node is within the carrier sensing range (CSRange) of a transmitting node, in presence of no other interference, the PCS mechanism of the node would be triggered every time a packet is detected.
Virtual Carrier Sensing (VCS) -
The VCS mechanism is defined in addition to the PCS [2] . VCS uses the information found in IEEE 802.11 packets to predict the status of the wireless medium and determine how long a node has to wait before attempting to transmit. If a node is within the transmission range (TXRange) of a transmitting node, in presence of no other interference, the VCS mechanism of the node would be triggered every time a packet is being detected.
Transmitter Side
A transmitter would refrain from transmitting a DATA packet if it can sense the transmission of another ongoing transmission. The transmission of Link i will interfere with the transmission of Link j if,
Receiver Side
In IEEE 802.11 commercial products, when T i is already transmitting, T j can still transmit if T i interferes only with R j but not T j . However, R j will ignore the DATA from T j and not transmit an ACK to T j fearing it may interfere with the ongoing transmission on Link i [1] . The transmission of Link i will interfere with the transmission of Link j if,
Power Constraints by Liew
Liew, in [1] , has modeled the Physical Collision Constraints using Eq. 14.
As we are modeling a network with nodes that use DA, Eq. 14 is not suitable for such a network. We have extended Eq. 14 by incorporating the direction of transmission θ as shown in Eq. 2.
Liew has considered the Virtual Carrier Sensing Range (VCSRange) and the Physical Carrier Sensing Range (PCSRange) when modeling the Protocol Collision Prevention Constraints. VCSRange refers to the virtual carrier sensing ranges by the transmission of RTS/CTS packets and PCSRange refers to the physical carrier sensing ranges by the transmission of DATA packets [1] . For the correct operation of the physical layer we have considered the CSRange and TXRange which is limited by the carrier sensing range and transmission ranges of any packets sent over a wireless channel. This is because non-RTS/CTS packets such as DATA do also have VCS functionally.
Graph Models for Attacking Case

In this section the Physical Collision Constraints and the Protocol Collision
Prevention Constraints are used to model 3 weighted directed graphs: the LinkInterference Graph, the Transmitter-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph, and the Receiver-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph. These graphs will be used to construct our improved Attacking Case metric. Let us define the general graph G as a collection of vertices V and unidirectional edges E that connect pairs of vertices with weights w.
For any unidirectional edge e ij ∈ E where i, j ∈ V , vertex i represents Link i consisting of T i and R i nodes, while e ij represents a relationship between Link i and Link j. The weight is a function of e ij where w(e ij ) ∈ N. The value of w(e ij ) depends on the type graph being modeled.
We introduce the 3 proposed graphs by discussing two simple networks: 
Link-Interference Graph (i-graph)
A Link-Interference Graph is used to represent the Physical Collision Constraints and it captures the SIR effects among links. The graph is represented as follows:
The i-graph of the network topology illustrated in Fig. 5a can be represented by the graph in The edge e ij is labeled with its w I (e ij ).
Consider the topology of Fig. 5a where the nodes use OA. There is a direc- In general, if any of the constraints in Eq. 4, 5, 6 or 7 is satisfied, an edge would be drawn from vertex i to vertex j to signify that Link i is interfering with Link j. We propose that the unidirectional edge in the i-graph has a weight w I (e ij ) characterized as follows:
where Eq. 17 is built using components of characteristic function as defined in Eq. 18.
Since w I (e ij ) exists only when there is an e ij , w I (e ij ) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} for i-graph.
For the OA setup in Fig. 5a , its i-graph has directional edge from vertex 1 and vertex 2 and vice versa with weight w I (e 12 ) = w I (e 21 ) = 3.
In In Fig. 5b a different node positioning is tested and the nodes use OA. In the figure we can observe that there are directional i-edges from vertex 1 to vertex 2 due to ACK 1 -DATA 2 pair of transmission and from vertex 2 to vertex 1 due to ACK 2 -DATA 1 pair of transmission. w I (e 12 ) = w I (e 21 ) = 1 for the i-graph and this is shown in Fig. 7 . We recall that in Fig. 5a the weight was 3, hence the topology of a network affects the outcome of an i-graph and its edge's weight.
In Fig. 5d and Fig. 5f no pair of transmission creates an i-edge between vertex 1 and vertex 2, and vice versa; in these setups the antenna type plays an important role in eliminating edges between the vertices.
From Fig. 5 and Fig. 7 we can conclude that the DA and DR setups lead to the smallest interference. The OA setup has the highest value of weight on the i-edges. The more weight an i-edge has the more prone it gets for packet collision. Network 1 and Network 2 enable us to conclude that the topology affects the weight of an i-edge.
Transmitter-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph (tc-graph)
Let us consider the effect of IEEE 802.11 carrier sensing. The goal of carrier sensing is to prevent simultaneous transmissions that will collide. The tc-graph models the effect of carrier sensing by the transmitters and it is represented as follows:
In the tc-graph there is a directional tc-edge from vertex i to vertex j if T j can sense the transmission on Link i so that, if T i or R i are already transmitting respectively a DATA or ACK packet, T j will not transmit. Formally, there is a tc-edge from vertex i to vertex j if any of the Eq. 8, 9 or 10 holds true.
In Fig. 5a , T 1 and T 2 are not sufficiently far apart and they can sense each other. There is directional tc-edge from vertex 1 to vertex 2 because the transmitter of Link 1 interferes with the transmitter of Link 2. Specifically, the transmission of DATA from T 1 and ACK from R 1 will prevent DATA from T 2 to be transmitted. There is also a directional tc-edge in the reverse direction;
the transmission of DATA from T 2 and ACK from R 2 will prevent DATA from
The edge in the tc-graph has a weight w T C (e ij ) characterized as follows:
Since w T C (e ij ) exists only when there is an e ij , w T C (e ij ) ∈ {1, 2} for tcgraph. For the setup in Fig. 5a , w T C (e 12 ) = w T C (e 21 ) = 2 and the tc-graph obtained can be observed in Fig. 7 .
As the tc-graph models the effect of carrier sensing purely from the transmitter point of view, it does not consider tc-edges created due to the DATA 1 -ACK 2 and ACK 1 -ACK 2 pairs of transmission from vertex 1 to vertex 2 and DATA 2 -ACK 1 and ACK 2 -ACK 1 pairs of transmission from vertex 2 to vertex 1 due to its effect solely at the receiver.
In Fig. 5c the antenna is directional. There are tc-edges from vertex 1 to vertex 2 due to DATA 1 -DATA 2 pair of transmission and from vertex 2 to vertex 1 due to ACK 2 -DATA 1 pair of transmission. The tc-edges which occur in OA setup for ACK 1 -DATA 2 and DATA 2 -DATA 1 do not exist in DA setup. This is because of the ability of DA to point its beam to its intended receiver which also reduces interference to unwanted directions. For the setup in Fig. 5c , w T C (e 12 )
= w T C (e 21 ) = 1 and its tc-graph is shown in Fig. 7 .
In Fig. 5e the tc-graph is the same as for the DA setup, where tc-edges exist from vertex 1 to vertex 2 due to DATA 1 -DATA 2 and from vertex 2 to vertex 1 due to ACK 2 -DATA 1 pairs of transmission. As in i-graph, the transmission power reduction has no gain for tc-graph for this topology. w T C (e 12 ) = w T C (e 21 ) = 1 for the scheme in Fig. 5e , and Fig. 7 shows the tc-graph observed.
For Network 2 using OA (Fig. 5b) there are directional tc-edges from vertex 1 to vertex 2 due to ACK 1 -DATA 2 pair of transmission and from vertex 2 to vertex 1 due to ACK 2 -DATA 1 pair of transmission. The weight, w T C (e 12 ) = w T C (e 21 ) = 1. We recall that in Fig. 5a the weight was 3 and reaffirm that network topology affects the outcome of an tc-graph and its edge's weight.
In Fig. 5d the antenna is directional. The ACK 1 -DATA 2 and ACK 2 -DATA 1 pairs of transmission which were present in the OA setup do not cause tcedges anymore, but the DATA 1 -DATA 2 and vice versa pairs of transmission cause tc-edges for the DA setup. This is because though interference is able to be contained on unwanted direction, it actually increased in the direction of transmission when DA is used. For the setup in Fig. 5d , w T C (e 12 ) = w T C (e 21 ) = 1 and its resultant tc-graph is shown in Fig. 7 .
In Fig. 5f none of the pairs of transmission create a tc-edge between vertex 1 and vertex 2 and vice versa. In this case, DA and transmission power reduction have played an important role in eliminating edges between the vertices.
From Fig. 5 and Fig. 7 we can conclude that the DA and DR setups lead to the smallest interference. The more weight a tc-edge has the more a node will trigger its exponential backoff mechanism. Network 1 and Network 2 enable us to conclude that, as in i-graph, the topology affects the weight of tc-edges.
Receiver-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph (rc-graph)
In rc-graph the effect of carrier sensing by receivers is modeled. The graph is represented as follows:
There is a directional rc-edge from vertex i to vertex j if R j can sense the transmission on Link i. Specifically, there is an rc-edge from vertex i to vertex j if any of Eq. 11, 12 or 13 is true. In the default mode of IEEE 802.11 commercial products, when T i is already transmitting, T j can still transmit if there is an rc-edge, but no tc-edge, from vertex i to vertex j. However, R j will ignore the DATA frame and will not return an ACK [1] . The rationale for R j not returning an ACK to T j is that the ACK may interfere with the ongoing transmission on Link i.
In Fig. 5a , R 1 and R 2 are so close to each other that the DATA and ACK transmission of Link 1 can be sensed by R 2 and the DATA and ACK transmission of Link 2 can be sensed by R 1 . Thus, there is a directional rc-edge from vertex 1 to vertex 2 and vice versa.
An edge in the rc-graph has a weight w RC (e ij ) characterized as follows:
Since w RC (e ij ) exist only when there is an e ij , w RC (e ij ) ∈ {1, 2} for rcgraph. For the case of Fig. 5a , w RC (e 12 ) = w RC (e 21 ) = 2 and its rc-graph is shown in Fig. 7 .
Since rc-graph models the effect of carrier sensing purely from the receiver point of view, it does not consider rc-edges created due to the ACK 1 -DATA 2 and DATA 1 -DATA 2 pairs of transmission from vertex 1 to vertex 2, and ACK 2 -DATA 1 and DATA 2 -DATA 1 pairs of transmission from vertex 2 to vertex 1.
In Fig. 5c and in Fig. 5e rc-edges were created in both the setups due to DATA 1 -ACK 2 pair of transmission from vertex 1 to vertex 2 and ACK 2 -ACK 1 pair of transmission from vertex 2 to vertex 1. For the cases of Fig. 5c and Fig. 5e, w RC (e 12 ) = w RC (e 21 ) = 1 and its rc-graphs are shown in Fig. 7 . DA has contributed to reduce the weight of the edges.
In Fig. 5b there is rc-edge from vertex 1 to vertex 2 due to DATA 1 -ACK 2 and ACK 1 -ACK 2 pairs of transmission. There is also rc-edge from vertex 2 to vertex 1 due to DATA 2 -ACK 1 and ACK 2 -ACK 1 pairs of transmission. For the setup in Fig. 5b , w RC (e 12 ) = w RC (e 21 ) = 2 and its resultant rc-graph is shown in Fig. 7 .
In Fig. 5d and Fig. 5f both the setups have rc-edges due to DATA 1 -ACK 2 pair of transmission from vertex 1 to vertex 2 and DATA 2 -ACK 1 pair of trans-mission from vertex 2 to vertex 1. The weight w RC (e 12 ) = w RC (e 21 ) = 1.
From Fig. 5 and Fig. 7 we can conclude that the DA and DR setups are able to contain interference and assist in reducing the weight of the edges.
The transmission power control has no advantage for these networks as the power reduced is still insufficient to curtail interference in the direction of DA's transmission.
For i-graph, tc-graph and rc-graph all the vertices are the same, where V =
Improved Attacking Case Metric
Attacking Case corresponds to the number of cases where simultaneous transmissions are either not allowed or if allowed will not be successful. Attacking
Case can be used as a performance metric to quantize the interference of a network. A high Attacking Case value leads to potentially poor aggregated network throughputs. We propose the following: 1) if e i,j is an i-edge then twice the i-edge's weight is added to the Attacking Case else; 2) if e i,j is a tc-edge then the tc-edge's weight is added to the Attacking Case, and 3) if e i,j is a rc-edge then the rc-edge's weight is added to the Attacking Case for all i,j where i = j as shown in Eq. 23.
Eq. 23 takes into account the order of transmissions. If e i,j is an i-edge, it does not matter whether Link i or Link j transmits first, the packet at Link j will be corrupted. Hence, there are two cases where Link i can interference with Link j. On the other hand if e i,j is a tc-edge or rc-edge, transmission at Link j will not be allowed or will fail only if Link i transmits first. So, there is only one case considered.
Graph Models for Liew's Attacking Case
Liew in [1] has modeled the Attacking Case using the graph model in Eq.
24.
We have extended Eq. 24 by associating it with weights w to the edge of the Link-Interference Graph, Transmitter-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph, and Receiver-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph as shown in Eq. 15.
In Liew's method, if e i,j is an i-edge then 2 is added to the Attacking Case,
else if e i,j is a tc-edge then 1 is added to the Attacking Case, else if e i,j is a rc-edge then 1 is added to the Attacking Case for all i,j where i = j, as shown in Eq. 25. We have improved Liew's method by considering the weights of the graphs and the method used to calculate the Attacking Case metric using the i-graph, tc-graph and rc-graph, as shown in Eq. 23.
Attacking Case Metric Evaluation
In this section the improved Attacking Case metric (Eq. 23) is used to quantize the severity of interference in CSMA/CA based networks by means of Network Simulator 2 (ns-2) simulations [25] . Firstly we show that the Liew's Attacking Case metric does not address nodes using DA. Secondly we show that our improved Attacking Case supports nodes using DA and it is also compatible for nodes using OA. Thirdly we show that our improved Attacking Case metric is able to quantize the interference for networks that use various transmission power schemes.
ns-2 Simulator Enhancements
When a node hears the arrival of packet A via CCA and if the received power is above a certain threshold, the packet is received by the node. First, the Fig. 8 , packet C may be received provided its received power is above the predefined SIR. The current behavior of ns-2 does not consider this aspect and disregards packet C [25] . We have extended the ns-2 simulator to consider this as we are studying scenarios operating in the overloaded conditions.
ns-2 was also improved to support nodes with DA. Each node is assumed 
Simulation Setup
We defined a 3 In practice only one interface will be active at any one time due to carrier sensing among interfaces. 
Attacking Case
We evaluate our improved Attacking Case metric against Liew's Attacking
Case over a wireless network and compare the results of both. The value of Attacking Case indicates the potential for packet collisions and exponential backoffs in a wireless network; the higher the value of Attacking Case the smaller will be the aggregated throughput observed in the network. (c) Seed 100 Figure 11 : Example of random topologies for network with nodes using OA and 9 STAs
Using the setup described in Section 5.2, the simulation results for Attacking
Case for networks with nodes using OA and DA are presented in Fig. 12 .
The solid lines represent networks with nodes using OA and the dashed lines represent networks with nodes using DA. The x-axis captures the total number of STAs in the network. The number of STAs were increased by incrementing the STA/AP ratio (1, 2, 3, 4). On the y-axis, the Attacking Case in the network is calculated using our improved approach and Liew's approach. The simulation results for aggregated network throughput are also presented in Fig. 13 against the total number of STAs in the network. There are four curves in Fig. 12 representing the improved and Liew's Attacking Case for OA and DA. In Fig.   13 , there are two curves for the aggregated throughput for network using nodes with OA and DA.
Liew's Attacking Case and Directional Antenna
Firstly, we show that the Liew's Attacking Case does not model adequately networks consisting of nodes using DA. In Fig. 12 Liew's Attacking Case is presented by the lines with circle points. We can observe that the value of -the Liew's Attacking Case metric is calculated using Eq. 25. As the edge's weight is not considered in its calculation and only depends on the presence of an edge, the Attacking Case value for OA and DA is the same using Liew's approach. For Network 1 in Fig. 7 , the Attacking Case calculated using Liew's method is 8 for both OA and DA; b) direction of transmission, θ -the Attacking Case calculated using Liew's method for Network 2 in Fig. 7 is 8 for OA; this value considers the i-edges caused by ACK 2 -DATA 1 and ACK 1 -DATA 2 pairs of transmissions. For DA though the i-edges due to ACK 2 -DATA 1 and ACK 1 -DATA 2 are no longer present because the DA is able to point its beam to its intended direction and reduce interference on unwanted direction, but since θ was not considered by Liew for the construction of the power constraints the same i-graph would result for DA and OA. The resultant i-graph for Network 2 using Liew's method is shown in Fig. 14 . Thus the Attacking Case value for DA will be the same as OA. In conclusion, the Attacking Case metric calculated by Liew gives the same value for OA and DA irrespective of the number of STAs, as shown in Fig. 12 . However when the aggregated network throughput of OA and DA is evaluated in Fig. 13 there are big differences between them. DA's throughput outperforms OA by at least 290% for the case of 9 STAs, calculated according to Eq. 26. This suggests Liew's Attacking Case is not adequate to quantize the severity of interference for networks with nodes using DA.
Improved Attacking Case supporting Directional Antenna
Secondly we show that our improved Attacking Case supports nodes using DA and it is also compatible with nodes using OA. In Fig. 12 Fig. 13 where DA performed close to 500% better than the OA for the case of 36 STAs.
In Fig. 13 , as the number of STAs increase the aggregated throughput for DA increases but the rate of increase reduces. This is because the network with nodes using DA is getting saturated. Adding more STAs though increase the amount of offered load to the network unfortunately the network unable to transport more packets due to high exponential backoffs and collisions persist in the network. For OA, due to the nature of the antenna transmitting at all direction, the network gets saturated at much lower STAs than DA as shown in Fig. 13 . Due to this reason the aggregated throughput is constant for OA even though the attacking case in Fig. 12 increases.
Using Improved Attacking Case in Networks with Various Transmission Power
Thirdly, we show that the improved Attacking Case metric is useful to quantize the severity of interference in networks where various transmission powers are used. Let us define the default transmission power in ns-2 as DP-NChan [25] .
In order to evaluate different levels of interference and its effect on Attacking Case, apart from using DP-NChan, the network is also simulated using a minimum transmit power (MP) approach. In this approach the transmission power is enough for a transmitter node to get its transmitted packets decoded by its receiving node. We studied the minimum transmit power approach by using the following 3 setups:
• the minimum power per network (MP-PNetw) -in this setup the interfaces in nodes are allowed to reduce its transmission power, but all the interfaces in the network must use the same transmission power. OA and DA use it.
• the minimum power per node (MP-PNode) -in this setup, as above, the interfaces are allowed to reduce its transmission power. Each node is allowed to have its own transmission power but all the interfaces of a node must use the same power. OA and DA use it.
• the minimum power per interface (MP-PInte) -in this setup each interface is allowed to reduce and use its own transmission power. Only DA uses this.
The rest of the parameters used for the simulations are shown in Table 1 .
The improved Attacking Case and Liew's Attacking Case were calculated using Eq. 23 and Eq. 25 respectively for all these networks. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 15 , Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 . Liew's Attacking Case in Eq. 25 consists of components in Eq. 27, Eq. 28
and Eq. 29. Table 2 shows the values for these components for the example of network with 36 STAs. As the sum of i-edges, and rc-edges that are not part of tc-edges and i-edges increases, the sum of tc-edges that are not part Table   2 .
i,j∈V i =j
i,j∈V i =j The improved Attacking Case in Eq. 23 consists of components in Eq. 30, Eq. 31 and Eq. 32. Table 3 shows the values of these components for the same network. It shows dissimilar values of Attacking Case compare with Table   2 . The improved Attacking Case metric is able to represent the changes in the aggregated throughput in Fig. 16 more accurately. This shows the usage of weight of edges w(e ij ) is important to model the severity of interference in networks where various transmission powers are used.
i,j∈V i =j Comparing the 3 minimum transmit power setups, the power control per interface has the least interference in the network and, as a consequence, it leads to the highest aggregated network throughput. Then it is followed by power control per node, and power control per network. The default transmission approach is the least attractive setup. The additional degree of controlling power by interface in DA makes it more attractive than OA. In conclusion reducing Attacking Case can result in a potentially increase of throughput. The reduction of Attacking Case can be achieved by using strategies such as DA, transmission power reduction, or DA with transmission power reduction.
We have shown that Liew's Attacking Case metric is not adequate for networks with nodes using DA; hence the need for a new Attacking Case metric.
We have also shown that our improved Attacking Case supports nodes using DA and it is compatible with nodes using OA; the improved Attacking Case metric is able to distinguish the severity of interference by network using nodes with DA and OA. Lastly, we have shown that our improved Attacking Case can be used to quantize the interference in networks that use various transmission power schemes.
Conclusions
Interference is a fundamental issue in wireless networks and it affects the aggregated throughput of a network. In this paper we have characterized the power interference in IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA based networks using DA. An improved Attacking Case metric that quantizes the severity of interference has been proposed using the Link-Interference Graph, Transmitter-side Protocol Collision Prevention Graph, and Receiver-side Protocol Collision Prevention
Graph. This metric differs from Liew's Attacking Case metric proposed in [1] as the original metric only addresses networks using OAs. Our improved Attacking
Case metric is meant for networks using DA but it can also be used in networks using OA. It was also found that interference is tied with Attacking Case, thus reducing Attacking Case can result in an increase of throughput. The reduction of Attacking Case can be achieved by the usage of strategies such as DA, transmission power reduction, or DA with transmission power reduction. The relationship between Attacking Case and the throughput of a network is worth to be studied; if there is a statistically strong relationship between these two, a model could be built which is useful to predict the throughput of a network once its Attacking Case is calculated. The prediction model would be of assistance in the planning process of a network. This activity remains as our future work.
It would be advantageous to use Attacking Case to predict the throughput as the Attacking Case metric could be calculated using simple procedure with the knowledge of node positions, transmission power, signal to interference ratio and radio propagation rather than using a discrete event network simulator.
Network simulators demand simulator specific codes to be developed, multiple simulations to be executed, wait for the simulations to be completed, and output logs to be analysed; only then one would have the knowledge on the expected throughput. 
